The Minnesota Chapter
of the National Institute
of Governmental Purchasing, Inc.

-Established 1981-

I.  The Decision to Bid

     A. Purpose of Bidding

1.  The Minnesota Supreme Court has indicated the underlying intent of the competitive bidding statutes in the following statement:  " A fundamental purpose of competitive bidding is to deprive or limit the discretion of contract making officials in the areas which are susceptible to such abuses as fraud, favoritism, improvidence, and extravagances."  Griswold v County of Ramsey, 65 N.W.2d 647 (Minn. 1954).

2.  However, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v. Metropolitan Sports Facilities Commission,381 N.W.2d 842 (Minn. 1986) held that the bidding statutes are to be narrowly applied.  The Court found the agreement for the scoreboard system for the stadium "is more than a contract for merely materials, supplies, or equipment....Many of the features of the agreement are simply beyond any fair meaning of contracts for materials, supplies and equipment with in the statute."  Id.at 846.  Thus, the court concluded that the competitive bidding statute (Minn. Stat. 471.345) did not apply.  The following lengthy quote is instructive of the court's reasoning:

We have recognized that public bidding provisions are to be construed narrowly.  In R.E. Short Co. v Minneapolis, 269 N.W.2d 331, 342 n. 11 (Minn. 1978), we noted that the public bidding statute is restrictive and should not be extended to contracts not envisioned by the legislature.  In Griswold v. Ramsey County, 65 N.W. 2d 647, 651 (Minn. 1954), we stated:  "In the absence of a controlling constitutional, statutory, or charter provision, it is generally held that public policy does not demand that a municipal corporation...advertise for bids and let the contract to the lowest responsible bidder." ...One authoritative text notes:  "These [competitive bidding] provisions are strictly construed by the courts, and will not be extended beyond their reasonable purport.  Such provisions must be read in the light of the reason for their enactment, lest they be applied where they were not intended to operate and thus deny municipalities authority to deal with problems in a sensible, practical way."  10 E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3rd ed.) S 29.29 (citations omitted).  This principle of narrow construction requires that the contract being challenged must unambiguously fall within the language of the public bidding statute...

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